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Schick: Evidence - Use, in the Federal Courts, of Accused's Silence after

EVIDENCE-Use, in the Federal Courts, of Accused's Silence After Miranda
Warnings to Impeach His Trial Testimony. United States v. Hale, _.
U.S.
95 S.Ct. 2133 (1975).

William Hale was arrested after being identified by a
robbery victim from whom five men had taken ninety-six
dollars. Hale was taken to the police station, advised of his
right to remain silent, searched, and found to be carrying
one hundred and fifty-eight dollars in cash. When an officer
asked, "Where did you get the money?" Hale made no response. At trial in the District Court for the District of Columbia, Hale took the stand and presented an exculpatory
version of the facts, including testimony that his estranged
wife had received her welfare check the day of the robbery
and had given him the money to purchase money orders for
her, as he had done several times in the past.' On crossexamination the prosecutor questioned Hale about his failure
to explain his possession of the money to the police after his
arrest.2 The trial court instructed the jury to disregard the
testimony, but refused to declare a mistrial, and conviction
followed. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
reversed,' holding that inquiry into defendant's silence impermissibly prejudiced his defense and infringed upon his
right to remain silent under Mirandav. Arizona.4 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to resolve
a conflict in the federal courts of appeals on the question of
whether the Constitution allows impeachment of a criminal
defendant by evidence of his silence under police interrogation.' In deciding Hale, however, the Court did not reach
the constitutional issue but held that, in the circumstances of
the case, evidence of Hale's silence was insufficiently probative and was outweighed by the prejudicial impact of its
admission.'
Copyright 02 1976 by the University of Wyoming

1. United States v. HaleU.S ,95 S.Ct. 2133, 2135 (1975).
2. Id. at 2135-36. The colloquy was as follows:
Q. Did you in any way indicate to the police where the money
came from?
A. No, I didn't.
Q. Why not?
A. I didn't feel it was necessary at the time.
3. United States v. Anderson, _
D.C. App -......- , 498 F.2d 1038 (1974).
4. 384 U.S. 436 (1965).
5. United States v. Hale, supra note 1, at 2135.

6. Id,
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INTRODUCTION

Although the Hale decision appears to be a purely evidentiary determination limited to the circumstances of the
case, a close reading suggests that its effect may be more farreaching than first appears. The Court stressed that because
Hale was under custodial interrogation and had just been
given his Miranda warnings, his silence could just as easily
be taken to indicate reliance on his right to remain silent
as to support an inference of later fabrication, and thus was
not probative on the issue of credibility.7 The fifth amendment privilege and the Miranda warnings created the setting which rendered the accused's silence ambiguous. This
setting will generally be present in cases of the Hale pattern;
the accused's silence will generally be ambiguous and thus
inadmissible under Hale.
BACKGROUND:

THE EVIDENTIARY PERSPECTIVE

Evidence of a prior inconsistent statement is admissible
to impeach the credibility of a witness. Such evidence casts
doubt on the accuracy or truthfulness of both the prior statement and the trial testimony.8 Evidence of prior inconsistent
conduct, of which silence may be an example, is also admissible to impeach,9 though subject to the criticism that it is
often ambiguous."0
Generally, "a failure to assert a fact, when it would have
been natural to assert it, amounts in effect to an assertion
of the non-existence of the fact."" The later assertion of
the fact at trial raises an inconsistency. The important
language is "when it would have been natural to assert it."
In a case like Hale, the question is: Would it have been
natural for the accused, if his testimony at trial is true, to
volunteer his account of the facts to the police after being
given the Miranda warnings? -The emphasis, from the evidentiary viewpoint, is on the degree of inconsistency, if any,
between his prior silence and his testimony.
7. Id. at 2137.

8. MCCORMICK, EvIDENCE § 34 (2d ed. 1972).

9. Id. n.7.
10. Cf. Id. § 270, at 652; Commonwealth v. Dravecz, 424 Pa. 582, 227 A.2d 904
(1967).
11. 3A WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1042, at 1056 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
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On the question whether an accused's prior silence is
inconsistent with exculpatory testimony at trial, the leading
pre-Mirandacase is Grunewald v. United States,1" which was
extensively cited by the Hale court. In Grunewald, one of
the defendants, Halperin, had claimed his fifth amendment
privilege before the grand jury; at trial, on cross-examination he answered the same questions asked before the grand
jury in a manner consistent with innocence. The prosecutor
brought out his former claim of privilege and the court instructed the jury that the defendant's prior silence could be
considered for credibility only. The Supreme Court held that,
in the circumstances, Halperin's silence before the grand
jury was not inconsistent with innocence. The Court identified three factors relevant to determining that the silence
was not inconsistent: (1) Halperin's repeated assertions of
innocence; (2) the secretive nature of the tribunal before
which the questions were asked, and (3) the focus on Halperin as a potential defendant at the time of questioning."
The Court thus made it clear that under some circumstances
evidence of the prior silence of an accused will be insufficiently probative and may not be used to impeach his testimony. As later in Hale, the Court did not reach the question
of whether the Constitution permits impeachment of an accused's testimony by evidence of his prior assertion of the
right to remain silent.
BACKGROUND:

THE CONSTITUTIONAL

PERSPECTIVE

The Supreme Court held, in Agnello v. United States,"
that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment
may not be used for impeachment. 5 In Walder v. United
States, 6 the Court held that unlawfully obtained evidence
might be used to impeach a defendant who had "opened the
12.
13.
14.
15.

353 U.S. 391 (1957).
Id. at 422-23.
269 U.S. 20 (1925).
Id. at 35. "The essense of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence
in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used
before the Court but that it shall not be used at all." Quoting Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States. 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). Agnello may be
read more narrowly as forbidding merely the "bootstrapping in" of impeachment evidence by eliciting the testimony to be impeached for the
first time on cross-examination.
16. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1976

3

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 11 [1976], Iss. 1, Art. 11

292

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XI

door" by making affirmative assertions about matters collateral to the issue of guilt or innocence of the crime charged.
The Walder rationale was that the accused may not use the
government's inability to produce the evidence on direct as
a shield for his own perjury. 7 The Walder exception, or
"collateral use doctrine," was applied unevenly and with
difficulty because of doubts about its meaning and scope.1"
Some courts extended the exception to apply to pre-trial statements obtained in violation of the fifth amendment."0
0 appeared to overrule Walder insoMiranda v. Arizona"
far as the Walder exception had been applied to fifth amend-

ment questions;1 however, in Harris v. New York" the

Court made it clear that Miranda would not be read as forbidding the use of illegally obtained, non-coerced statements
to impeach the testimony of a criminal defendant, so long as
the evidence is trustworthy. 3
Prior to Harris, the federal courts generally took the
view that, under Miranda, the accused's silence after Miranda warnings could not be used to impeach his trial testimony.24 Harris clearly overruled Miranda's prohibition
against impeachment use of illegally obtained statements.
Did it also overrule Miranda's prohibition against use of
the accused's silence under custodial interrogation?" This
is the question that has created a division of authority in the
federal courts of appeals.
17. Id. at 65.
18. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, at § 178 n.3.
19. Comment, The Impeachment Exception to the Constitutional Exclusionary
Rules, 73 COLUM. L. Rzv. 1476, 1480 (1973).
20. Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 4.
21. Id. at 477.
[S]tatements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant
are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate
untruths in the statement given under interrogation and thus to
prove guilt by implication. These statements are incriminating in
any meaningful sense of the word ....
See also United States v. Fox, 403 F,2d 97, 102-03 (2nd Cir. 1968).
22. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
23. Id. at 224.
24. Fowle v. United States, 410 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Brinson, 411 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1969) ;-United: States v. Semensohn, 421
F.2d 1206 (2nd Cir. 1970).
25. Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 4, at 468 n.37.
In accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to penalize
an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when
he is under police custodial interrogation. The prosecution may
not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he stood mute or claimed
his privilege in the face of accusation.
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THE CONFLICT IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS

The Third and Fifth Circuits have interpreted Harris
as allowing impeachment of the accused by evidence of his
prior silence, while the Tenth and District of Columbia Circuits have held the evidence inadmissible.
The Third Circuit considered the question in Agnellino
8 and held that evidence of the accused's silence
v. New Jersey"
was admissible under Harris."7 Agnellino was tried and
convicted of receiving stolen goods. On appeal, he argued
that his fifth amendment rights had been violated when the
trial court allowed the prosecutor to comment on his failure
to include, among other information he gave the police after
Miranda warnings, the name of the person from whom he
had obtained the goods. Agnellino produced the name at
trial, and portrayed the sale as a course-of-business transaction.
Judge Hunter, writing for the court, interpreted these
facts as an instance of the use of an accused's silence to impeach his credibility. Starting with the proposition that a
defendant who takes the stand waives not only his right to
remain silent at trial but prior assertions of the right as
well, 8 and arguing from Grunewald21 that only where the
accused's silence is utterly lacking in probative value is its
use constitutional error, Judge Hunter concluded that the
evidence is constitutionally inadmissible only where its use
amounts to a violation of due process." The fifth amendment protections, so important in Miranda,were thus brushed
aside.
The other two judges on the Agnellino panel, who concurred in the result, did not regard the case as one of silence,
but of prior inconsistent statements falling squarely within
26. 493 F.2d 714 (3rd Cir. 1974).
27. Id. at 719. In an earlier case, United States ex rel. Burt v. New
Jersey, 475 F.2d 234 (3rd Cir. 1973), the same court reached a similar
conclusion, but the Burt facts do not clearly present the issue.
28. Id. Citing Raffell v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926), in which the
Court said that the fifth amendment privilege is for the protection of defendants who do not take the stand at trial.
29. Grunewald v. United States, supra note 12.
30. Agnellino v. New Jersey, supra note 26, at 722.
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the Harrisrule. 1 This division in the court casts some doubt
on the finality of Agnellino as an expression of the Third
Circuit's position.
The Fifth Circuit has held that it is constitutionally
permissible, under severely limited circumstances, to use
the accused's silence after Miranda warnings to impeach his
trial testimony. In a trio of cases, United States v. Ramirez,"United States v. Quintana-Gomez,3 and United States v.
Harp,4 the court reasoned that, if the defendants' trial testimony were true, their silence even after Mirandawarnings
was so inherently improbable that it was admissible on the
issue of credibility. 5 The court recognized that, as a general
rule, prosecutorial comment on the accused's exercise of his
right to remain silent violates the Constitution; but the rule
has its exception. Where the accused offers a defense at trial
which in the light of common sense is totally inconsistent
with pre-trial silence, then the evidence is admissible.3 "[I]t
is the rare and exceptional case where comment on silence is
permissible. Total inconsistency is the criterion.""
The Tenth Circuit, in Johnson v. Patterson,38 rejected
the view that the accused's pre-trial silence may be used to
impeach his testimony. Harris, said the court, dealt with
prior inconsistent statements, which clearly bring the accused's credibility into question, whereas silence at the time
of arrest is simply "the exercise of a constitutional right that
31. Id. at 728-30. Both concurring judges took the view that the tenor of
Agnellino's statement to police was inconsistent with the tenor of his
testimony at trial. Chief Judge Seiz asserted that comment on silence,
after Miranda warnings, would be constitutionally improper.
32. 441 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1971).
33. 488 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1974).
34. 513 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1975).
35. In both Ramirez and Quintana-Gomez, defendants testified that they had
been compelled to participate in narcotics transactions by mysterious third
parties, under threat of injury or death. Neither defendant mentioned the
threats to the police. The facts in Harp were more exotic. Nine inmates,
charged with attempted escape, offered in defense that they had been forced
to accompany a tenth inmate in his escape attempt and had, in effect, been
kidnapped. The tenth admitted the "kidnapping" but pleaded insanity.
The accused inmates omitted to produce their account of the facts at any
time during numerous interviews with officials.
36. United States v. Harp, supra note 34, at 789-90.
37. Id. at 790. In another case, United States v. Fairchild, 505 F.2d 1378 (5th
Cir. 1975), the court refused to find the evidence admissible, because the
silence lacked the requisite degree of improbability in the light of the
accused's testimony.
38. 475 F.2d 1066 (10th Cir. 1973).
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all persons must enjoy without qualification." 3

295

The court

reasoned that, under Miranda, use of the accused's silence

to impeach amounted to the imposition of a penalty on the
exercise of a constitutional right, and as such was forbidden
4"
by Griffin v. California.
In United States v. Anderson," the District of Columbia
Circuit held that evidence of the accused's silence lacked
probative value, and that even if it were probative, it would
be constitutionally impermissible to use it against the accused in court, even for impeachment. The court found Har-

ris inapplicable, since the Harris defendant did not assert
his right to remain silent under interrogation, but spoke.
The accused who remains silent explicitly avails himself of
a fundamental right and under Griffin the assertion of such

a right may not be penalized. "Nothing in Harrisundercuts
this fundamental constitutional principle since Harris did

not involve assertion of the constitutional right."4
In both Johnson and Anderson the courts relied in part
on Griffin's prohibition against imposing a penalty on the
assertion of a constitutional right. Some doubts" about the
continuing validity of the Griffin principle have been raised

by McGautha v. Calfornia" and three guilty plea cases decided in 1970."' These cases, however, involve a waiver of

rights by the accused, and the question presented has to do
with what subsequent results of the waiver are constitution39. Id. at 1068. Since the court in Hale did not reach the constitutional argument, the Johnson holding remains undisturbed and is mandatory precedent
should the question of silence evidence arise in the Federal District Court
for the District of Wyoming. The Wyoming Supreme Court has taken a
similar view in holding in Gabrielson v. State, 510 P.2d 534 (Wyo. 1973),
that using the accused's silence against him at trial imposes an impermissible penalty on a fundamental right. See particularly, Judge Guthrie's
concurring opinion at 539-40.
40. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). The Griffin Court held that prosecutorial comment
on the accused's failure to testify was impermissible because it penalized
the exercise of a fundamental right by making its assertion costly.
41. United States v. Anderson, supra note 3. The government's appeal from
the appellate court's decision in Anderson resulted in the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Hale. The conviction of Hale's co-defendant
Anderson was affirmed by the appellate court and he did not appeal.
42. Id. at 1044.
43. See Judge Breitenstein's dissent in Johnson v. Patterson, supra note 38, at
1070; Agnellino v. New Jersey, supra note 26, at 723.
44. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
45. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) ; MeMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
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ally permitted. The silence cases do not involve waiver but
rather the direct and unequivocal assertion of the right itself."
UNITED STATES V. HALE

The Hale facts present the accused's assertion of his
right to remain silent in its purest form. Hale was arrested
after being pointed out by the robbery victim, was given his
Miranda rights, and then, when asked to explain his possession of a sum of money, stood mute. At trial he gave an account of his possession of the money which was consistent
with innocence. 7
The Court noted the inherent ambiguity of silence in
general and then went on to find Grunewald controlling. "
The court interpreted the Grunewald criteria as applying
with even more force to Hale than to the Grunewald defendant: Hale asserted his innocence, police interrogation is
even more secret than a grand jury proceeding, and Hale
had been singled out as a potential defendant, having been
arrested after an identification by the victim." The factors
which suggested that silence was not inconsistent in Grunewald served to aid the same determination in Hale.
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), held that it was constitutionally intolerable to use as substantive evidence the accused's testimony
given at a preliminary hearing on an unsuccessful motion to suppress evidence as illegally obtained under the fourth amendment. The Court indicated in McGautha that in so far as the Simmons rationale was based on
avoiding a tension between constitutional rights its validity was open to
question. Similar reasoning is seen in the guilty plea cases. It does not
follow, however, that in drawing Simmons' rationale into doubt these cases
also draw into doubt the Griffin prohibition against imposing a penalty
on the dircet assertion of a fifth amendment right. Simmons, McGautha
and the guilty plea cases all involve a waiver by the accused of his right
to remain silent. The cases deal with the consequences which may constitutionally follow upon the accused's waiver. It may be that an unarticulated underlying explanation for these decisions is the impatience and dissatisfaction of the Court with the difficulties of determining whether a
particular waiver was voluntary. MeGautha and the guilty plea cases may
perhaps be read as part of an attempt by the Court to set limits on the
extent to which a defendant may escape the results of a waiver of rights
by asserting a constitutional violation in retrospect.
In Hale and similar cases, however, there is no question of waiver.
The accused directly and unambiguously asserts a constitutional right, the
right to remain silent. It does not follow that McGautha and the guilty
plea cases, in setting limits on the extent to which an accused may escape
the results of a waiver, undermined the Griffin prohibition against penalizing the direct assertion of a fifth amendment right.
47. United States v. Hale, supra note 1, at 2135.
48. Id. at 2136.
49. Id. at 2138.
46.
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The Court's decision in Hale rests on the lack of probative value of the accused's silence, and the prejudicial impact
of evidence of this type. It is significant that the Court
stressed the lack of probative value and gave the question of
prejudice little more than passing mention. 0 If the Court
had intended to limit its holding narrowly to the unique circumstances of the case, it would have stressed the prejudicial
impact of the evidence in the light of the general weakness
of the case against Hale.5 Instead, it emphasized the evidentiary inadequacy of the evidence by underlining Hale's
position as an accused, in custody, who had just been given
the Miranda warnings. These are the circumstances of all
those whose cases raise the problem discussed herein. The
Hale holding, in the context of the whole opinion, would appear to mean that the silence of an accused, after Miranda
warnings, will seldom, if ever, be probative as to his credibility at trial. Thus, though the Court declined to deal with
the constitutional issue, its evidentiary holding is broad
enough to mandate the exclusion of the silence evidence with
a certainty approaching that of a constitutional prohibition.
SUMMARY

The Court recognized, in Hale, that since it is not "natural" for an accused to reply to police questions after Miranda warnings, his answers to the same questions at trial
do not raise an inconsistency. By relying on Grunewald, a
pre-Miranda case, the Court avoided dealing with the question whether the Constitution prohibits use of the evidence.
Hale indicates a reluctance to hasten the undermining of
Miranda by further extension of the Harris doctrine. If it
had seen fit to do so, the Court could have applied the reasoning of the Third Circuit in Agnellino" and found that
only where the evidence was totally lacking in probative
50. Id.
51. For instance, the Court might have emphasized that Hale's account of his
possession of the money was corroborated by his wife and the merchant
who had sold him money orders in the past; that he offered an account of
his activities which suggested a reason why the victim might have erroneously identifed him; that he offered a reasonable explanation for his flight
when pointed out by the victim; and that the trial testimony of the victim
was contradictory and confused. (For corroboration and victim's testimony, see United States v. Anderson, supra note 3.)
52. Agnellino v. New Jersey, supra note 26.
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value should it be excluded. Hale leaves open the question
of what the Court would do with a case like Harp" in which
the accused's silence looks so improbable in the light of his
testimony that it strains common sense to exclude it on
evidentiary grounds alone. Confronted with such a case,
the Court would be forced to reach the constitutional issue.
Finally, Mr. Justice White's concurrence 4 goes to the
real, non-technical heart of the issue. The Miranda warnings suggest very strongly to the accused that his best course
is to remain silent, and so any lawyer would advise him. It
offends the fundamental community sense of fair play which
underlies due process to turn the accused's reliance on an
officially recognized right into the means of discrediting him
at trial.
PATRICIA SCHICK

53. United States v. Harp, supra note 34.
54. United States v. Hale, supra note 1, at 2139-40.
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